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1 Introduction 
The growing literature on evaluating additional interconnectors sets out methodologies for 
their evaluation.1 Their value is the increase in consumer welfare plus the decrease in total 
electricity system costs compared to the counterfactual. The social value measures all costs 
and benefits at efficiency prices, including all external costs of CO2 emissions and other 
pollutants. Private value measures these at possibly distorted market prices. Any cost-benefit 
analysis must make predictions about future generation and other interconnector investments 
as well as their interaction. It needs to assess impacts on future emissions that will be affected 
by fuel and carbon prices. Policies for managing cross-border flows like market coupling, rules 
on access and access charging, renewables subsidies and the choice of discount rate for 
these very durable investments can strongly affect the results. It is unsurprising that plausible 
values for specific projects range from negative to strongly positive.2 Rather than evaluating 
future projects, this paper looks at the value of existing interconnectors to GB as they have 
been impacted by the EU Third Energy Package and GB carbon taxes. It quantifies the 
contributions of market coupling for an important example of controllable DC links, and makes 
the case for wider adoption of an EU carbon price floor. 
The EU attaches additional significance to interconnection when announcing €48 billion in 
priority energy infrastructure in 2018: “Properly interconnected electricity lines and gas 
pipelines form the backbone of an integrated European energy market anchored on the 
principle of solidarity. A fully interconnected market will improve Europe's security of supply, 
reduce the dependence on single suppliers and give consumers more choice. It is also 
essential for renewable energy sources to thrive and for the EU deliver on its Paris Agreement 
commitments on climate change.”3 This paper measures both the private and social value of 
electrical interconnectors to GB, including the value of increased security of supply. The more 
nebulous concept of solidarity falls into the category of non-monetary benefits. It is clearly 
challenged by debates in the UK to leave the EU. 
Continental electricity systems are synchronised and meshed, so that flows across borders 
follow the laws of physics, not the dictates of national regulators. In contrast, Britain is 
connected to its neighbours by controllable DC links. Continental cross-border trade was 
initially managed by each national or sub-national system operator through a conservative 
assessment of Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) followed by redispatch if cross-border flows 
deviated too far from planned transfers. Increasing Variable Renewable Electricity (VRE, wind 
                                               
a UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources, University College, Central House, 14 Upper Woburn 
Place, London WC1H 0NN, UK. emails: g.castagneto-gissey@ucl.ac.uk , p.dodds@ucl.ac.uk . 
b Energy Policy Research Group, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Ave., 
Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK; emails: dmgn@cam.ac.uk, bg347@cam.ac.uk  
1 de Nooij (2011), ENTSO-E (2016), Meeus et al., (2013a, 2013b), Turvey (2006). 
2 Aurora (2016), de Nooij (2011), National Grid Interconnectors (2014), Pöyry (2012, 2016, 2017), Policy 
Exchange (2016), Redpoint (2013) 
3  https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/completing-energy-union-eu-invests-eu48-million-priority-energy-
infrastructure-2018-jul-16_en  
3 
 
and solar PV) made this more difficult, often leading to a decrease in ATCs to increase security 
margins.  Increased VRE added pressure to harmonise neighbouring Continental markets and 
to make better use of cross-border trade. The successful model of the Nordic market led to 
the Third Energy Package (Directive 2009/72/EC) and with it the Target Electricity Model 
(TEM) that came into effect in 2014.  
The Directive requires markets to be coupled. Interconnector capacity is cleared 
simultaneously with bids and offers from national markets through the European Day Ahead 
Market (DAM) auction platform EUPHEMIA. If all desired flows across coupled interconnectors 
are feasible, prices are equated on each side. If the flows at a single price are infeasible, prices 
are set to clear each zone and the interconnector capacity fully allocated so that electricity 
flows from low to higher prices zones. Continental markets are mostly self-dispatched energy-
only markets, with which the DAM is immediately compatible. Although by 2014 GB had a 
capacity auction to allocate capacity agreements that paid for availability in stress hours, 
generators self-dispatch and the wholesale market clears through power exchanges and 
bilateral trades. Accommodating to the European Union’s DAM was unproblematic and 
completed by 2014. 
In contrast, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland form the Single Electricity Market 
(SEM), a centrally dispatched regulated pool. Changing that design to align with the TEM 
required a derogation and a considerable delay to make the necessary changes. It took until 
1 October 2018 for the SEM to be finally coupled to GB and to the EU DAM. 
The early debates about the Third Energy Package demonstrated the inefficiency of 
interconnector use to argue for reform, and change from ATC calculations to a flow-based 
market coupling model (e.g. KU Leuven, 2015). Newbery et al. (2013, 2016) estimated the 
potential benefit to the EU of coupling interconnectors to increase the efficiency of trading day-
ahead, intra-day and sharing balancing services efficiently across borders. Their report for DG 
ENER provided estimates for the EU as a whole, based on evidence from ACER (2014). 
Adopting the ACER methodology but excluding the apparently miscalculated SEM-GB values 
(discussed below) Newbery et al. (2016) estimated the value of coupling at the day-ahead 
stage for a sample of interconnnectors at €12,670/MWyr of ATC capacity. Intra-day trading 
was estimated at a modest 4% of the benefits of coupling day-ahead, and complete shared 
cross-border balancing (still awaited) might be worth as much as 130% of day-ahead coupling. 
These estimates could be reduced allowing for improved EU-wide integration that should 
improve price convergence and reduce arbitrage gains. Additional gains from reducing 
unscheduled flows and curtailment would not apply to GB coupled interconnectors.  
Newbery et al. (2016) also calculated the benefits of coupling Interconnexion France 
Angleterre, IFA, allowing for the impact trade would have on prices and costs, setting out the 
methodology used in this paper. They made a more careful estimate of coupling Moyle, which 
connects Northern Ireland to Scotland to correct ACER’s (2014) over-estimate. 
Others (e.g. Gugler et al., 2018; Keppler et al., 2016) have studied the extent to which market 
coupling increased price convergence. They conclude that the large increase in VRE offset 
much of that price convergence but that further interconnection would improve price 
convergence. More importantly, the resulting social benefits would be substantial. De Nooij 
(2011) criticised the cost-benefit analyses of NorNed and East–West interconnectors, arguing 
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that they lacked a suitable counterfactual in which generation investment responds to the 
presence or absence of interconnection, their impact on competition (particularly important for 
market concentration on the island of Ireland). He noted the VRE benefits or reduced 
curtailment that interconnectors could provide. Newbery (2018) compared investment in 
interconnectors with storage and flexible back-up as ways of reducing the cost of intermittency 
from VRE.  
Substantial benefits from new GB interconnections to the Continent have been widely 
demonstrated (Aurora, 2016; National Grid, 2014; Policy Exchange, 2016; Pöyry, 2012, 2016; 
Redpoint, 2013). Pöyry (2014) finds four projects with a net social Present Value between 
€0.1bn/GW and €0.7bn/GW to GB. Pöyry (2016) concludes that 9-11 GW of interconnection 
capacity would provide a net benefit to GB, but additional investment faces falling marginal 
benefits, with negative net benefits in several market scenarios.  
This paper uses the more extensive data from the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform4 for the 
period after market coupling. It measures the private and social benefits of the existing 
controllable DC British interconnectors. This is motivated by the rush to propose and 
commission new interconnectors, the concern that some of the private benefits may arise 
because of Britain’s introduction of a carbon tax on fossil fuel for electricity generation that is 
not matched by the rest of the EU, and, looming ever larger in public concern, the fear that the 
benefits of market coupling may be lost if the UK leaves the European Union (Geske et al., 
2018). 
This paper argues that: 
 the private benefits of interconnectors are indeed large (relative to their cost); 
 these benefits have been amplified by the increasing liquidity in markets over time-
scales from more than a year ahead to intra-day trading; 
 there are additional inframarginal social benefits not captured by trading from 
substituting cheaper imports for more expensive local generation – but that the 
distortions caused by asymmetric carbon taxes are indeed substantial. 
We make some final remarks concerning the potential costs of uncoupling existing 
interconnectors (but not on the possible impact of market uncoupling on planned or proposed 
future interconnector projects). 
2 Interconnector Trading 
The British power system currently links to France through IFA (2,000 MW capacity), to the 
Netherlands through BritNed (1,000 MW), to Belgium through NEMO (since 31 Jan 2019, 
1,000 MW), to Northern Ireland through Moyle (maximum 500 MW),5 and to the Republic of 
                                               
4 At https://transparency.entsoe.eu/  
5 From Nov 2017 to Nov 2019 exports from Northern Ireland were 80 MW firm but an additional 420 
MW may be released by GB if there is spare GB transmission capacity, while exports to Ireland were 
450 MW in winter and 410 MW in summer. See http://www.mutual-energy.com/electricity-
business/moyle-interconnector/trading-across-the-moyle-interconnector/.  
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Ireland through EWIC (the East-West Interconnector, 500 MW). Northern Ireland and the 
Republic form the Single Electricity Market (SEM) so GB has two links to the SEM.  
Interconnector capacity is sold forward in auctions held at various moments for year-ahead, 
season-ahead, quarter-ahead, month-ahead, day-ahead, intraday (and balancing). 6  The 
forward contracts, Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) are sold as use-it-or-sell-it, meaning 
that any capacity bought in forward markets not nominated in the day-ahead market (DAM) is 
released into the DAM and the holders of the FTRs receive the DAM price. In practice, about 
90% is sold forward, but all FTRs are cleared in the DAM, which is run at noon (CET) to 
determine prices for each hour of the following day. 
FTRs have the same advantage as Contracts-for-Differences (CfDs) in local markets. The 
contracting parties lock in a strike price, s, on which they can contract with consumers for an 
agreed price. If in the specified hour, the spot price p in the relevant market (e.g. the DAM) is 
above the strike price, the CfD buyer (retailer) pays the DAM price p and receives from the 
CfD seller (generator) the difference (p-s), making the effective cost just the strike price, s. 
The CfD seller, who has sold in the spot market at p, has to pay p-s, so effectively receives 
the strike price, s. (The argument is symmetric if p < s.) Both buyer and seller are thus hedged 
at the strike price regardless of what happens in the spot market. The critical advantage of 
these financial forward contracts is that dispatch is driven by DAM prices, not the strike prices. 
If a supplier expects to generate and sell at s, close to its marginal cost, m, and if s > m > p, 
the supplier would not generate. Instead a lower cost generator produces, meeting demand 
at lower cost. 
After the DAM auction there are a number of intra-day market (IDM) auctions for GB and the 
SEM, while on the Continental most intra-day trading is conducted continuously on 
EPEXSPOT. Neuhoff et al., (2016) demonstrate that this is inferior to periodic auctions by 
comparing the German experience with both formats. Finally, System Operators take control 
close to dispatch and may schedule balancing flows across interconnectors, calling on bids 
from Balancing Responsible Parties. The eventual aim of the Target Model is to clear 
balancing bids across borders. Section 9 gives more details and analysis of these various 
markets. 
The interconnector owners sell the FTRs forward at what is the market’s estimate of the cross-
border price difference, augmented by the value of optionality, as FTR holders are not required 
to honour unprofitable FTRs. The owners also receive the cross-border price difference for 
any unsold capacity, but the IDM is mainly a market between other participants. The revenue 
from trading over different time periods is therefore not necessarily the revenue received by 
the owner.  
The revenue will depend on price differences, but the real value is larger, as the ability for GB 
to import or export up to 5,000 MW makes a potentially appreciable difference to the market 
clearing price in both GB and France and reduces the overall cost of meeting demand. This 
                                               
6 IFA data are available at https://damasifa.unicorn.eu/Long-term_Auction_Statistics.asp while BritNed 
data are available at https://www.britned.com/participants-portal/explicit-auctions/. Balancing actions 
are not yet fully coupled through markets but are available to System Operators. 
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additional benefit is discussed below, together with possible distortions to trade arising through 
differences in carbon pricing in coupled markets.  
 
Figure 1. Prices in the Day Ahead Market in Britain, France and Netherlands. Source: ENTSO-E 
Transparency Platform. 
Figure 1 shows the lagged 28-day moving average of the DAM hourly prices in GB, France 
(FR) and Netherlands (NL), as well the cost of generating electricity in a 50%7 efficient 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine, including the cost of the EUA.8 The gas cost explains some of 
the price variation, and was a closer match in NL, where gas was likely to be the marginal fuel 
much of the time, as it was more costly than coal until mid-2018, when the EUA price rose 
sharply.  
GB and NL have very similar fuel mixes so one might expect similar wholesale prices. Figure 
1 shows that during 2015-2017, there is a persistent difference with GB on average 
€14.98/MWh more expensive than NL, while FR is only on average €2.86/MWh more 
expensive than NL. Over the whole period, GB and NL had price difference of less than 
€0.5/MWh (effectively the same) 2% of the time, and less than €5/MWh 28% of the time. Price 
differences across IFA were less than €0.5/MWh (also effectively the same) 19% of the time, 
and less than €5/MWh 31% of the time. 
One obvious reason for the higher GB price is that since 2013, GB (but not Northern Ireland) 
has levied a carbon tax on fuel used to generate electricity (the Carbon Price Support, CPS). 
In April 2015, the CPS roughly doubled from about £9 to £18/t CO2, raising the cost of fossil 
generation. This made coal the more expensive fuel in GB while gas was cheaper in NL in 
                                               
7 This is the Lower Heat Value, which is 90% of the Higher Heat Value.  
8 The EUA is the EU Allowance price for CO2 set by the Emissions Trading System. Gas contains 
0.185 tonnes CO2 per MWh heat content, hence 0.185 EUA is added to the price of gas. The cost is 
twice this augmented price assuming 50% efficiency at Lower Heat Value. 
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2018. Chyong et al., (2019) estimated this carbon tax (£18 or €20/tCO2) would increase the 
system marginal cost by £5 to £8/MWh from 2015-2017 by identifying the marginal CO2 
emissions in each half-hour (t CO2/MWh) and multiplying that by the carbon tax (£/t CO2). Guo 
et al. (2019) estimated that only 60% (SD 12%) of that, or £3 to £5/MWh (an average of 
€4.5/MWh) of the variable cost has been passed through to GB DAM prices. This only 
accounts for one-third of the average price excess. As NL is tightly connected to a highly 
meshed Continental grid, NL prices may be depressed by cheap nuclear French power and 
high renewable volumes from Denmark and Germany (Blume-Werry et al., 2018; Hirth, 2018). 
3 The impact of Market Coupling 
Britain has been coupled to France through IFA and the Netherlands through BritNed since 
2014. The SEM was only finally coupled on 1 October 2018, while NEMO was only 
commissioned on 31 January 2019 and is not considered in this paper.  
3.1 IFA Day Ahead coupling  
A standard measure of the success of coupling is that trade flows from lower- to higher-priced 
zones, and failure is measured by Flows Against Price Differences (FAPD). Figure 2 shows 
trading across IFA in 2013 before the markets were coupled. If the GB price is higher than the 
French price (adjusted for losses to the half-way point of 1.17%)9 then GB should import from 
France (top-right hand quadrant), but if GB prices are lower (i.e. GB-FR prices are negative) 
then if GB imports it does so in the wrong direction as a FAPD. 
 
Figure 2. Net imports into GB over IFA against day-ahead price differences during 2013 (exports shown 
negative).  
Source: GB price from N2EX, FR from EPEX. 
                                               
9 http://ifa1interconnector.com/media/1022/ifa-loss-factor.pdf  and 
https://www.nationalgrideso.com/sites/eso/files/documents/Border_Specific_Annex_IFA_Interconnect
or_0.pdf   
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It is clear in Figure 2 that many observations cluster at multiples of 500 MW, the capacity of 
each of the four lines. That is because of line restrictions, either because of their 
unavailability,10 or because of network limitations within France or GB.11 Quoting the footnote 
source “In normal operation, IFA flow is not permitted by the GB Network TSO to change at 
more than 100MW/minute for frequency management purposes. This limitation also has 
benefits on the Continental Network. Daily Implicit Auctions are expected to utilise IFA 
capability more fully (function of the daily price difference), thereby causing large hour-hour 
variations of power transfer more frequently (2GW and vice versa).” If flows were to be 
reversed, the 4,000 MW change would require 40 minutes to complete. This can explain some 
of the FAPDs but not all. 
The average 2013 GB imports were 1,189 MW/hr at an average GB price excess of 
€15.83/MWh, giving an average value of €26,405/hr. This is the loss-adjusted price difference 
times the value of the physical flow, reduced by €3,642/hr because of FAPD. As GB was 
almost always more expensive than France, the percentage of FAPD was modest at 10% 
(ignoring small perverse price differences). The value destruction was as much as 14% of the 
total value of €231 million/yr at €31.9 million/yr.  
 
Figure 3. DA scheduled net imports into GB over IFA vs day-ahead price differences, 2017.  
Source: GB price from N2EX, FR from ENTSO-E, data truncated at +/- €100/MWh. Flows from RTE forecast 
flows. 
                                               
10 The IFA capacity is shown on the Nordpool website at http://www.nordpoolgroup.com.com/Market-
data1/N2EX/Capacities/UK/Hourly/  and BritNed gives information at https://www.britned.com/ .  
11 E.g. “Different requirements from NWE TSOs inclusion of the Allocation Constraints (as foreseen in 
the current draft Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Network Code, CACM). Allocation 
Constraints are to be respected during the capacity. Allocation Constraints may include: operational 
security constraints, ramping constraints, transmission interconnector losses. The resulting IFA Daily 
Flow will be set by Euphemia taking into account the Allocation Constraints as submitted by the 
Operators during the pre Explicit Daily Auction invoked during the Implicit Daily Auction Window 
Notice (Rule 5.4 Schedule IV an E4.4.4). (IFA Interconnector within the NWE Price Coupling solution). 
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Once IFA was coupled the situation changed. Figure 3 shows the scheduled flows — the 
amounts allocated in the DAM auction — in MW against DAM price differences for 2017.12 
ENTSO-E publishes the ATC in each direction, and for lengthy periods 500 MW (one of the 
four lines), and occasionally 1000 MW was out of service. The clustering of flows at units of 
500 MW is very clear and reflects the periodic unavailability of one or more lines. The value of 
the actual flows using the ATC values for capacity is 99.33% of the maximum feasible flows 
allowed. Changes in the direction of flows by trading in the IDM and BM occur less than 1% 
of the time. The value of DAM congestion rent in 2017 is €178 million, with the (loss-adjusted) 
GB price on average €6.58/MWh higher than in France (roughly half the average for the period 
2015-18 shown in Figure 1). 
  
Figure 4. Ex post GB net imports from France as a percent of ATC against the GB minus French (FR) price 
differences, calendar 2015.  
Sources: Flows and prices from ENTSO-E Transparency platform. 
Figure 4 shows the percentage of Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) actually used (after 
further adjustments in subsequent trading on the day) against DAM price differences for 2015. 
The DAM trading value in 2015 was €270 million (compared to €231 m in 2013). 
3.2 BritNed coupling Day Ahead 
Figure 5 shows the scatter of GB exports (or negative imports) against the DAM GB price less 
the Dutch price for the electricity year (April 1 to Mar 31) 2015-16,13 adjusted for losses 
totalling 3%.14 Again we assume that the DAM clears efficiently, so that all deviations in the 
                                               
12 RTE publishes forecast flows after the DAM auction clears but before flows occur, so they represent 
the allocation at the DA stage. ENTSO-E publishes scheduled flows that record the actual flows over 
all time-scales including intraday and balancing and these are used in figure 5 and below to calculate 
subsequent changes in flows. 
13 There are many missing price values in the first quarter of 2015. 
14 Source: https://www.britned.com/about-us/operations/ 
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actual flow compared to efficient use arise from intraday and balancing actions. Almost all of 
the time actual trade is in the same direction as the flows determined in the DAM. The DAM 
2015-16 revenue is €135 million, of which €5 million was bought back and retraded intraday, 
discussed in the next section.   
 
Figure 6. Trade vs price difference over BritNed, Electricity year 2015-16.  
Note: truncated at €50/MWh. 
Another performance metric is the percentage of potential congestion revenue, assuming the 
whole 1,000 MW are available 100% of the time. From 2015-18 this measure of efficiency is 
95% (€12,276/hr vs €13,378/hr) yielding €107 million/yr.  Figure 7 shows the evolution of two 
measures of congestion revenue. 
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Figure 6. Congestion revenue estimated from DAM prices and recorded congestion revenue. 
 
The darker line in Figure 6 is the loss-adjusted price difference times the scheduled 
commercial exchanges. Congestion income is defined as before. The two measures are 
clearly quite different, in contrast to the recent IFA experience, and cannot be explained by 
the difference between scheduled and actual flows (which are small). It may be that it is the 
result of contracts over different time periods (year, quarter, month, day ahead, and intraday) 
where the contract prices will inevitably differ from the DAM price. Over the whole period the 
two are almost identical, but the ratio of the DAM revenue to the congestion revenue falls from 
268% in 2015 to 63% in 2018. Risk aversion could possibly explain differences in prices traded 
ahead and intraday, with an apparent shift from a preference for intraday risk in the early 
period to a desire to hedge ahead of time later (perhaps driven by a lack of liquidity in the 
forward markets). The evolution of these forward markets is considered in section 9. 
 
3.3 The effect of the Carbon Price Support 
Guo et al. (2019) estimated that the CPS increased net import over IFA in electricity years 
2015-2018 from 7.8 TWh/yr without the CPS to 11.7TWh/yr with the CPS, or an annual 
average of 3.9 TWh of net imports are because of the GB CPS. As France owns half of IFA, 
the CPS profited their share of IFA by roughly €26 million/yr. UK consumers paid more, 
National Grid profited from its share of IFA, 15  and the Government received extra CPS 
revenue.  The estimated impact on Britned’s total congestion revenue was to increase it by 
€33.7 million/yr, about one-third of the DAM congestion revenue under market coupling. Again, 
this would have been split half to National Grid and half to Tennett.  
 
                                               
15 This is estimated from half the difference in trade revenue with and without the CPS. 
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4 Intraday timeframes 
4.1 IFA post-DAM trading 
Figure 3 shows the capacity allocated in the DAM auction while Figure 4 shows the actual 
flows after subsequent trading during the day (shown as a percentage of the ATC to deal with 
periodic line unavailability). There are frequent positive price differences but less than 100% 
utilisation, because the actual flows are after trading in the intraday and balancing markets. 
Coupling implies that if there is a positive (loss-adjusted) price difference in the DAM, the full 
capacity is allocated at that stage. Subsequently capacity is made available subject to not 
exceeding the ATC. Thus if GB is importing at 100% of ATC after the DAM auction (2,000 
MW), it is only possible to release flows in the IDM from GB to FR, of which 4,000 MW is 
available. Conversely, if the GB-FR price difference is negative in the DAM, then GB would 
expect to export, but could buy imports up to 4,000 MW after the DAM auction has closed. If 
the change in direction exceeds the amount bought in the DAM, then there will be an apparent 
FAPD, based on the DAM prices and the actual flows settled after all the later markets have 
cleared. 
We can make an approximate estimate of this post-DAM trade clears as follows. In the DAM, 
the value of IFA assuming full utilisation is €270 million for calendar year of 2015. After the 
DAM, €13 million was bought back and used for reverse flows. As GB imported 97% of the 
hours in 2015, almost all the subsequent actions were GB exporting to France. At the very 
least traders must have bought out the GB importers at the price they paid in the DAM, unless 
the GB balancing price were less than the DAM value and the traders now wanted to reduce 
their demands. If the French balancing prices are higher than the GB DAM price (GBDAM), 
and if the traders could sell intra-day at something approaching the final French balancing 
price (FRBP), then the added value should be somewhat less than the FRBP-GBDAM price 
difference. For each shortfall of the actual flow and the ATC this should give an estimated 
value of reversing the flows. The results for 2015, taking only cases where the French 
balancing price is higher than the GBDAM, and summing over the changes in flows, is an 
additional €4 million. This ignores the small number of hours in which GB exports in the DAM 
and then reimports. 
Figure 7 shows the difference between the commercial forecast (volumes cleared in the DAM) 
and the real flows after all IDM trades and any balancing actions for IFA in 2015. It is clear 
that the major differences are off-peak night and to a lesser extent early afternoon. An obvious 
explanation is that GB is constrained by the position its generators need to be in to meet the 
early morning ramp-up (both to FR for their earlier peak and then for the GB peak). Rather 
than incur more costly ramping down and then up in GB, imports are reduced as a cheaper 
flexibility option. Closer examination shows that the main deviations are in the summer 
months, and that in these hours pumped storage is at maximum demand, while fossil 
generation is at minimum load. Hence, the main source of flexibility is to reduce imports 
relative to the earlier day-ahead (or even further back) position. Imports, mainly from France 
and the Netherlands, have been marginal in GB 13% of the time in 2017 (Castagneto Gissey 
et al., 2018). 
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Figure 7. Difference between DAM positions and out-turn averages by hour (UST) for 2015.  
4.2 BritNed post-Day Ahead Market trading 
We can estimate the value of post-DAM trading from the capacity bought back (or unused 
when DAM prices are equal).16 The extra revenue is the difference of the Dutch balancing 
price17 less the GBDAM value, times the minimum of the available interconnector value and 
the net balancing volume in the Dutch balancing market. The 2015 amount is €7 million. 
4.3 Assessment of coupling 
Coupling has considerably improved the value of IFA and BritNed, delivering efficiency in the 
DAM auction, while allowing adjustments after the DAM auction closes. These post DAM 
adjustments have modest value, perhaps because the underlying price differences are so 
large. This is consistent with the earlier estimates of Newbery et al., (2016) that the IDM only 
adds about 4% to the DAM value. The CPS has, however, because it applies only in GB and 
not with here trading partners, introduced a trade distortion. The impact on the social value is 
discussed below. 
                                               
16 In answer to a query, an analyst at BritNed replied: “We offer into the intraday auctions whatever 
capacity is available in either direction following the long-term nominations and day-ahead market 
coupling completion. Hence, if we have maximum 1GW scheduled flow into GB at day-ahead, we will 
offer 2GW into the Netherlands through the intraday process. If we are not at maximum scheduled 
flows, then capacity will be offered in either direction up to the maximum. We don’t have any specific 
pre-set amounts (blocks) for the intraday and there are no reserve prices, etc.” More details are 
available on the website https://www.britned.com/participants-portal/explicit-auctions/. 
17 Taking the higher of the up and down-regulation prices. 
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5 Interconnectors to the Single Electricity Market 
Britain has two connections to the SEM, finally coupled on 1 October 2018. Before then flows 
were highly inefficient, with FAPD roughly 50% of the time since 2015.18 Before coupling the 
SEM was a centrally dispatched audited bid pool in which indicative prices were published 
day-ahead on the assumption of no constraints.19 Settlement took place four days later at the 
outturn prices based on the actual security-constrained dispatch, typically different from the 
ex ante prices. About 25% of the time the difference was material. Traders wishing to use the 
interconnectors therefore based their decisions on inaccurate prices, or alternatively, ignored 
these ex ante prices and flowed according to their forward purchases. ACER (2014) estimate 
the cost of this inefficiency (for both interconnectors) at €54 million in 2013 and €69 million in 
2014, although Newbery et al. (2016) considered this a substantial over-estimate. Their 
estimate for Moyle in 2012 was €7.5 million compared with ACER’s (2014) estimate in 2012 
of €21.8 million. 
Table 1 below gives the SEM Committee’s (2011) estimates of the potential annual gain in 
social welfare of using the two interconnectors efficiently. SEM (2011) consulted Moyle 
interconnector users, finding they identified the deadband as €10-15/MWh between half hourly 
GB prices and expected ex post SEM prices, within which participants would not risk trading. 
Reasons included the very different gate closure times and ex-post pricing in the SEM, the 
lack of liquidity in day-ahead markets in both Ireland and GB and the risk of incurring 
Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) triad charges. Ofgem removed TNUoS 
charges for interconnectors users, reducing the deadband. At €5/MWh, the inefficiency would 
be €30 million/yr for both interconnectors. This intermediate estimate appears defensible. 
 
Deadband (€/MWh) Consumer surplus (€ millions) 
Producer surplus 
(€ millions) 
Total potential gain in social 
welfare (€ millions) 
0 28.6 12.1 40.7 
5 23.7 7.0 30.7 
10 19.6 4.1 23.8 
15 16.6 2.8 19.4 
Table 1. Moyle and East West interconnectors (950/910MW imports, 580MW exports). Source: SEM-11-023 
based on data for 2010 from the Moyle. Note EWIC was not commissioned until 2012. 
Since 1 October 2018 both interconnectors have been efficiently coupled, but whereas flows 
before GB introduced the CPS were mostly from GB to the SEM, now they are often in the 
opposite direction, despite the SEM having higher cost plant and greater carbon intensity. The 
social value of these interconnectors is thereby severely compromised by the lack of a SEM 
carbon tax. 
6 The value for security of supply 
Faced with growing evidence (and good economic theory; Newbery, 2016) that the liberalised 
electricity market was failing to invest adequately to deliver security of supply (DECC, 2010), 
the UK Government passed the Energy Act 2013 (HoC, 2013). Periodic (usually annual) 
auctions would procure sufficient capacity to deliver the reliability standard of an expected 3 
hours loss of load per year. National Grid was charged to recommend the capacity to procure. 
                                               
18 Fig 14  in https://www.semcommittee.com/publication/sem-18-033-sem-monitoring-report-q1-2018  
19 See the explanation of price setting in https://www.semcommittee.com/publication/sem-18-033-
sem-monitoring-report-q1-2018  
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In the first year National Grid (2014) assumed zero net contribution from interconnectors (but 
considered sensitivities up to 100% of 2.25 GW imports from Continental Europe). The Panel 
of Technical Experts,20 advising on National Grid (2014), drew on reports commissioned by 
Ofgem and the Government21 to argue that interconnectors, which are licensed separately 
and treated differently to generators, “can deliver power to GB and as such they should be 
treated in the same way as generation, with some probability, to be assessed, that they will 
be unable to deliver imports during GB stress events.”   
Subsequently, the European Commission required the UK Government to allow EU 
generators to bid into the capacity auctions. The compromise interim agreement was that 
interconnectors could bid. National Grid was charged to calculate interconnectors’ de-rated 
contribution to capacity adequacy. National Grid (2015) estimated these derating factors as 
50-70% for IFA, 62-80% for BritNed, and 2-10% for SEM for 2019-20. Estimates for 2022-23 
revised these to IFA, 59-86%, BritNed, 27-62%, SEM, 24-42%, and included NEMO (35-67%) 
and the proposed link to Norway (90-100%). 22  Successful bidders are granted capacity 
agreements to deliver their de-rated capacity. The System Operator gives those holding 
agreements 4 hours’ notice of a stress period, at which time they are required to be available 
to be dispatched or face a penalty. However, on 15 November 2018, the EU Court of Justice 
ruled the capacity agreements violated State Aid and they were immediately suspended.23 
The Government is working to ensure they will be reinstated as soon as possible. 24 We 
assume interconnectors provide capacity value even if not (yet) recognised by EU courts. 
This would seem to be easy for interconnectors to deliver. Either they are already flowing to 
GB (in which case they have delivered their obligation), or the interconnector owner can buy 
import capacity into GB through the intraday auction. We can estimate the capacity value of 
the three interconnectors using the results for the 2016 T-4 for delivery in 2020-21. IFA was 
awarded 1,193 MW, BritNed 888 MW, and SEM 252 MW. The auction cleared at a price of  
£22.50/kW/yr giving an annual capacity value for IFA and BritNed of £46.8 million (€57.3 
million/yr). Prices in the capacity auction have been volatile. The following year the T-4 auction 
for delivery in 2021-22 allocated 1,003 MW for BritNed, 1,260 MW for IFA, and 140 MW (just 
Moyle) for SEM. The auction cleared at £8.40/kW/yr, giving their total capacity value as 
£19(€22) m/yr for IFA and BritNed (National Grid, 2018). In that auction for the first time new 
interconnectors were successful: Nemo (GB-BE, 1,000 MW) was granted 750 MW, IFA2 
(1,000 MW) 715 MW and ElecLink (1,000 MW, GB-FR) 690 MW. 
The fall in auction prices may reflect a smaller amount of “missing money” (Grubb and 
Newbery, 2018) now that National Grid has defined and procured more short-run flexibility 
                                               
20 Newbery was a member of this Panel but writes in his personal capacity, drawing only on 
information in the public domain. 
21 Pőyry (2012), Redpoint (2013) 
22 Pöyry, 2018. An update of historical de-rating factors for Great Britain interconnectors, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capacity-market-and-interconnectors-an-update-of-
historical-de-rating-factors-for-great-britain-interconnectors  
23 See 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207792&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1430154  
24 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-market-reform-capacity-
market?utm_source=ba1f7ca5-ac48-41a8-afbd-
9527d207a185&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate  
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products, but could reflect falling demand and adequate existing capacity. Nevertheless, 4.1 
GW new capacity was procured, of which 1.2 GW of demand-side response cleared at this 
low price.  
7 Commercial profitability of IFA and BritNed 
Table 2 summarises the DAM arbitrage revenue for IFA and BritNed during electricity years 
2015-2018. The three-year average for the two interconnectors is €375 million/yr. On average 
these interconnectors delivered congestion revenue of about €125 million/GW/yr over the 
longer period 2015-18, or €125/kW/yr. BritNed cost about £2018 560 million (€640 million) and 
was commissioned in 2011. The 2017 arbitrage revenue was €92 million at DAM prices, but 
this excludes ancillary service revenue. The company accounts25 show that total revenue in 
2017 was €145 million with administrative expenses of €32 million, so other revenue (selling 
forward more profitably, as well as ancillary services) amounted to €53 million, or 36% of total 
revenue. Operating profits (after admin expenses) in 2015 and 2016 were over €200 million, 
or a net private rate of profit of over 30%. 
 
 DAM Arbitrage (million €) 
Electricity years IFA BritNed 
2015-2016 318 148 
2016-2017 197 137 
2017-2018 211 113 
Table 2. Day-ahead Arbitrage for IFA and BritNed in € million, electricity year 2015-2018. 
Table 3 summarises the various sources of commercial value. It is hard to be more precise 
than that IFA and BritNed contribute a capacity value of between €22-57 million/yr, or between 
6–15% of their DAM arbitrage value. Our earlier estimate shows that the intra-day value is 
about 3% of DAM value, or about €10 million/year, and ancillary service and other revenue for 
the newer and more capable BritNed of €53 million. If the same amount (half the value per 
MW) were to be achieved by IFA, then the total ancillary service value might be about €100 
million/yr. Table 3 summarises a central value (around which there must be considerable 
uncertainty) for the annual commercial value of trading over IFA and BritNed in 2015-2018. 
DAM arbitrage € 375 
IDM trading € 10 
ancillary services € 100 
capacity value € 40 
Total € 525 
Table 3. Commercial value of trading over IFA and BritNed in € million/yr. 
8 The social value of interconnectors 
Profitability is only a good measure of social value if prices are not changed by the 
interconnector flows and the prices measure social costs and benefits. Neither is currently true 
                                               
25 At https://www.britned.com/participants-portal/key-links-and-documents/annual-accounts/  The 
company accounts for National Grid Interconnectors (owner of half IFA) reports consolidated turnover 
of £93 m for 1/4/16 – 31/3/17 and £96.7 m for the following year, expenses of £22.9 m and £22.3 m 
respectively, but no breakdown between arbitrage and ancillary service revenue. 
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for GB trade. Table 3 estimated the commercial profitability, not necessarily the social 
profitability, as it includes the extra revenue from the asymmetric application of a carbon tax 
in GB, but not in the Netherlands burning fossil fuels. The French may claim to be delivering 
nuclear-fuelled electricity over IFA, but whether that is the marginal source is less clear, as 
either France will be importing from fossil-intensive neighbours or exporting less nuclear power 
there and inducing more fossil generation to meet demand. Castagneto Gissey (2018) 
estimates the French marginal share of carbon-intensive generation was 11% between 2015 
and 2017, supporting this assessment. 
 
Blume-Werry et al., (2018) suggest that 75% of the time foreign generators set the Dutch price. 
In their 2020 simulation, gas sets the price 35% of the time, coal 18% and very carbon-
intensive lignite 11% of the time. If coal is twice the carbon intensity of gas, and lignite three 
times, then the effective carbon intensity of Dutch electricity might be 0.35 tonnes/MWh and 
this would add roughly €7/MWh to the social cost26 of Dutch exports to GB, or about the same 
as the CPS added to GB electricity. This would increase the cost of GB imports from the 
Netherlands by about €50 million/yr, assuming no change in trade (i.e. because the 
Netherlands does not impose this carbon tax), reducing social profits in 2017 to €63 million, 
and giving a net rate of return of 10%. 
 
Figure 8. Trade over interconnectors at market prices (left panel) and with (right) EU CPS. 
In Figure 8a (left panel) AB is the supply curve of FR exporting over IFA in the DAM to GB, 
and DC is the demand by GB to import over IFA (including the CPS, taken here as the correct 
additional tax to add to the EUA to give the social cost of carbon). The maximum export over 
IFA is OX, and the DAM clears at a French price of G and at a GB price of F. The value of 
trade is FG * OX, but the full social value of the interconnector is the area ABCD, which has a 
value ½(AD + CB) * OX. The revenue thus understates the social value by the difference 
between these two areas. To give an approximate estimate in the case of IFA, if GB prices fall 
by €1/GW extra demand27 and the French price rises by €0.5/GW, then the difference between 
prices with no trade and with the full 2 GW of trade is €3/MWh if after coupling the full 2 GW 
are used. The extra uncounted social value would then be ½ x €3/hr x 2,000 MW or €3,000/hr. 
More generally, if prices converge after coupling, and the volume traded is X MW, the missing 
                                               
26 This assumes that the social cost of CO2 should be £18/t CO2 higher than the EUA price, based on 
the GB CPS value in 2016. A higher total social cost of carbon would increase the extra cost of 
imports but would require similar adjustments to the GB price, offsetting the change. 
27 A regression of DAM price on demand less wind for 2015 gives €1.19 +/- €0.02 /GW, slightly less 
(€1.11 +/- €0.02 /GW) for a regression of DAM price on demand less wind and less interconnectors. 
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social value will be ½ €1.5.X/1000*X/hr. In 2015, the average volume of trade was X = 1,641 
MW, so in this case the average missing social value was €2,020 /hr, or €17.7 million/yr. 
Figure 8b shows the potential distortion that arises when GB imposes a carbon tax (the CPS) 
while its trading partner does not. If this distortion were removed by the EU imposing the 
correct CPS, then the French supply schedule would shift up from AB to A*B*. The French 
price would rise to F* and the value of trade would fall to (F*G)*OX and the social value would 
be less than the market value (at distorted prices) by the area AA*B*B, leaving the shaded 
area as the correct social value of the interconnector. 
If the French price is set in Germany, then based on the German marginal share of energy 
generation in 2016 (from Castagneto-Gissey et al., 2018), and using the carbon intensity 
provided by Grid Watch28, an EU-wide CPS would raise the French price by an average of 
€7.38/MWh, slightly lower than an increase of €9.41/MWh for GB prices (using the same data 
source). The average volume traded in 2016 was 1,147 MW, the effect of the GB CPS alone 
is to increase congestion income by €95 million, which is paid by the GB citizens and equally 
split by both RTE and the National Grid. If an EU-wide CPS is implemented, congestion 
income would only rise by €21 million, a reduction of €74 million. 
9 Forward trading over interconnectors 
Forward trading predates market coupling. Before 2014 forward contracts were for rather 
illiquid Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs). After coupling, more liquid Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTRs) replaced PTRs as effectively CfDs. If the UK were no longer able 
to access EUPHEMIA after leaving the EU, then forward trading would likely revert to PTRs. 
This section examines what other contract markets might be able to replicate the FTRs, 
reducing the cost of uncoupling. 
 
                                               
28 http://gridwatch.co.uk/co2-emissions 
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Figure 9. FTRs and lagged DAM price differences over IFA. 
FTRs are auctioned ahead of delivery for periods of years, quarters, months and weeks at 
various dates during the year. For IFA,29 there are two auctions for annual contracts held in 
the middle of the first and third week of July the year before, and a third one in the middle of 
August. There are typically two auctions for the month ahead, for the quarter ahead held one 
or two months before, for the summer ahead held in Jan and Feb, and for the winter ahead in 
April and May. For IFA 93% of the available 2,000 MW are sold forward, of which half is for 
the calendar year. 
FTR auction clearing prices for IFA and Britned are publicly available.30 Figure 9 shows the 
lagged 28-day moving average of the DAM GB – FR price differences and the FTRs for the 
current month (sold the month before) and the current quarter.31 As FTRs are options only 
exercised if profitable, they are compared with the moving average of the positive values of 
hourly price differences. 
In 2015, the FTRs sold at a premium to the underlying product (the DAM price difference) but 
thereafter they appear to have converged, with if anything some undershooting. The FTRs 
give the right to import but losses mean that they are actually worth somewhat less than their 
price, which ignores losses. Appendix A gives tables showing the auction outcomes for both 
IFA and BritNed, showing the ratio of the latest (and presumably most accurate) auction price 
to the outturn. Thus for the 2015 monthly auctions the average ratio for IFA is 1.35 and for 
BritNed is 1.36 with coefficients of variation (CV) of 22% and 18%, whereas the hourly CV 
over the whole year for price differences across IFA is 83% (81% for Britned). The 2015 annual 
and quarterly auctions show a larger ratio or risk premium, as the hedge is taken under greater 
uncertainty about the future market conditions. Forward trading over the two interconnectors 
seems to be remarkably similar in risk aversion. However, by 2016 it would be hard to reject 
the hypothesis that the quarterly auctions exhibit no risk premium. 
9.1 Comparing FTRs and hedging on local power exchanges 
It is also possible to buy power forward in both France and GB (and NL, but we focus on 
France and GB) and replicate an FTR with CfDs. Indeed, Nordpool used CfDs to hedge zonal 
price differences rather than FTRs (Lundgren and Forsberg, 2016).  
                                               
29 See http://ifa1interconnector.com/media/1041/ifa-long-term-auction-timetable-2018.pdf  
30 FTR auction clearing prices for IFA are available at https://damasifa.unicorn.eu/Long-
term_Auction_Statistics.asp and for BritNed at https://www.britned.com/participants-portal/explicit-
auctions/. 
31 The FTRs were also compared for the month in which they were traded – i.e. DAM price differences 
for January 2015 were compared to the FTRs for February 2015 that were being auctioned in January 
2015, but these fail to match turning points in the DAM price differences, so the FTRs seem to have 
better predictive value and are compared with the delivery month. 
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Figure 10. Comparison between hedging across IFA using local power exchanges and FTRs compared to 
monthly DAM price differences for the delivery month.  
Source: Bloomberg and ENTSO-E. 
Figure 10 compares the two instruments for 2016 for selling from France to GB against the 
DAM monthly average for the delivery month. The auctioned FTRs are only issued at two 
points in the month (assumed here to be the first and second or third Wednesday), hence FTR 
I and FTR II, whereas the CfDs for the named month are traded actively on workdays for 
several months ahead (as shown in Appendix Figure A1). Here the CfD price differences on 
the dates of the FTR auction are shown as CfD I and CfD II. There appears to be considerable 
convergence after the first year (2015) except for December 2016, when French nuclear 
stations were off-line. 
Even if uncoupling meant FTRs reverting to PTRs, CfD markets in neighbouring countries 
should offer additional and rather complete hedging, reducing the damage of uncoupling. 
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10 Conclusions and policy implications 
We explored the efficiency of trading on the Day Ahead Market (DAM) auction platform before 
and after market coupling, and established that market coupling has indeed created efficient 
trading at the day-ahead stage on IFA and BritNed. The Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the 
island of Ireland was finally coupled on 1 October 2018 and since then the DAM auctions have 
efficiently used the interconnectors.32 Before that, it was trading very inefficiently, with flows in 
the wrong direction almost half the time, and losses that the regulators estimated for 2010 as 
€30 million/yr. ACER claimed even larger losses. The arbitrage revenue for trading capacity 
on the DAMs for IFA and BritNed averages about €125 million/GWyr, or €375 million/yr for 
both. The policy of coupling markets has therefore been successful, increasing the urgency of 
coupling balancing markets. Further investment in interconnectors is likely to be socially 
desirable, particularly with increased renewables penetration, subject to harmonising the 
treatment of carbon taxes across the EU. 
Trading after the DAM closes allows adjustments to be made, and GB often revises its off-
peak position to secure flexibility when fossil generation is at minimum load and pumping at 
maximum, so reducing imports is an effective balancing option. The value of intraday trading 
is however modest at €10 m/yr or about 3-4%, in line with earlier estimates for the EU 
(Newbery et al., 2016). Other ancillary service revenues are commercially confidential, but 
BritNed’s accounts suggest non-arbitrage income can be large, at around €50 million/yr (but 
this might include transitory foreign exchange gains). 
There are active forward markets for annual, seasonal, quarterly and monthly Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTRs). The 2015 FTR auctions traded at a substantial premium (about 
35%) to the cost of securing an equivalent baseload supply in the DAM, but this premium 
almost disappeared in the following years, consistent with growing familiarity with, and liquidity 
of, the FTR auctions. Hedging using CfDs on local power exchanges appears to offer as good 
a hedge as FTRs, again after the first year (2015), although local CfDs appear more sensitive 
to news, e.g. about scheduled power outages, that are alleviated in the DAM auctions as wider 
areas are coupled. 
The commercial value of IFA and BritNed together is substantial at about €525 million/yr, 
including contributions to security of supply. The social value is higher by about €18 million/yr 
of avoided infra-marginal generation cost. The British carbon price floor transfers €40 million/yr 
to the foreign share of IFA and BritNed. It also adds distortionary costs when trade flows 
change. The policy implication is that the EU should implement a carbon price floor at least in 
the electricity sector to remove this distortion while giving more stable investment signals for 
decarbonising power (Newbery et al. 2018). 
At present, the future relationship of GB with the European Union is unclear. A worst-case 
scenario might lead to uncoupling and even tariffs to use the EU transmission system (DG 
ENER, 2018). This could lead to a loss of much of the coupling benefit, although trading CfDs 
on neighbouring power exchanges supplemented by PTRs (as used before coupling) might 
continue to deliver most of the trading benefits. There would seem little to prevent setting up 
                                               
32 See the Single Electricity Market Performance 1 Oct 2018 – 31 Jan 2019 at  
https://www.semcommittee.com/sites/semc/files/media-
files/MMU%20public%20report%20Jan%2019.pdf  
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a similar DAM and IDM in GB for trading over the interconnectors, although sacrificing some 
gains from a pan-European simultaneous auction. It might even allow possibly better auction 
bid formats that better reflect the operating realities.33 Enhancing liquidity and transparency of 
such markets is clearly desirable whatever happens to the UK’s relationship with the EU. 
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Appendix A. FTR Auction data. 
Table A1 compares the efficacy of hedging using the last price available of CfDs on power 
exchanges and FTRs secured at the latest auction in the month. 
Monthly 
FR=>GB FTR I FTR II 
DAM 
option CfD last CfD I CfD II 
Jan-15 € 15.20 € 15.23 € 10.29 € 15.15 € 9.36 € 10.28 
Feb-15 € 14.64 € 16.53 € 8.10 € 5.49 € 8.06 € 7.03 
Mar-15 € 19.81 € 19.81 € 12.19 € 14.92 € 13.77 € 14.86 
Apr-15 € 29.55 € 26.54 € 21.71 € 19.10 € 23.24 € 21.85 
May-15 € 34.25 € 36.60 € 29.19 € 28.66 € 28.55 € 28.09 
Jun-15 € 36.25 € 36.34 € 25.26 € 28.02 € 26.48 € 27.95 
Jul-15 € 33.26 € 34.00 € 22.57 € 20.48 € 26.66 € 28.36 
Aug-15 € 37.80 € 25.45 € 23.89 € 28.87 € 28.92 € 30.83 
Sep-15 € 18.98 € 18.42 € 19.70 € 19.36 € 19.66 € 18.74 
Oct-15 € 17.10 € 14.49 € 10.09 € 15.62 € 17.14 € 17.16 
Nov-15 € 16.05 € 14.97 € 11.56 € 12.21 € 14.61 € 14.54 
Dec-15 € 13.26 € 13.26 € 13.67 € 16.06 € 14.33 € 13.46 
Jan-16 € 13.15 € 13.15 € 14.04 € 11.49 € 13.93 € 14.47 
Feb-16 € 10.76 € 9.34 € 17.44 € 11.11 € 10.01 € 10.72 
Mar-16 € 13.25 € 14.05 € 16.96 € 15.98 € 13.71 € 14.72 
Apr-16 € 14.99 € 15.01 € 17.14 € 17.82 € 18.28 € 17.29 
May-16 € 15.15 € 15.12 € 20.20 € 17.97 € 16.90 € 17.25 
Jun-16 € 15.43 € 16.65 € 19.46 € 19.72 € 18.10 € 17.84 
Jul-16 € 15.75 € 17.16 € 14.02 € 16.94 € 19.66 € 19.00 
Aug-16 € 15.01 € 12.79 € 11.31 € 16.06 € 16.72 € 15.77 
Sep-16 € 7.05 € 6.95 € 17.79 € 6.91 € 13.47 € 11.52 
Oct-16 € 3.60 € 2.23 € 5.41 € 16.52 € 9.67 € 10.55 
Nov-16 € 5.01 € 5.01 € 7.84 -€ 4.88 € 5.68 € 8.04 
Dec-16 € 6.03 € 4.34 € 3.77 -€ 10.21 -€ 39.66 -€ 13.59 
Jan-17   € 0.84 € 0.57 -€ 0.18 € 5.82 
Feb-17   € 7.54 € 1.12 € 8.50 € 0.23 
Mar-17 € 8.51 € 8.21 € 13.43 € 10.89 € 9.36 € 9.38 
Apr-17 € 14.30 € 15.55 € 13.42 € 16.63 € 16.09 € 17.54 
May-17 € 13.66 € 12.36 € 13.92 € 14.89 € 13.86 € 13.28 
Jun-17 € 10.70 € 10.40 € 10.84 € 10.35 € 11.94 € 11.43 
Jul-17 € 8.81 € 7.15 € 11.27 € 13.27 € 9.98 € 10.85 
Aug-17 € 8.00 € 11.00 € 14.78 € 15.33 € 12.35 € 9.41 
Sep-17 € 12.90 € 12.47 € 14.46 € 15.87 € 15.24 € 16.76 
Oct-17 € 6.12 € 6.60 € 3.42 € 2.21 € 6.28 € 7.65 
Nov-17 € 3.70 € 3.12 € 1.90 -€ 0.14 -€ 0.12 -€ 0.12 
Dec-17 € 3.47 € 4.02 € 10.34 -€ 0.14 -€ 0.12 -€ 0.13 
Table A1. Comparison of FTRs, DAM options and CfDs (IFA, 2015-17). 
In Table A1, CfD last is the last day’s closing price for GB – FR contracts, and CfD I and II 
align with the auction dates for the FTRs. FTRs have the advantage of being options not 
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obligations while CfDs can be retraded repeatedly. Auctions are normally considered to 
aggregate information better than continuous trading at any moment, but the latter can take 
account of more information as it unfolds. 
 IFA BritNed 
Month  Auction I  Auction II  DAM option 
Ratio 
II/Actual Month Auction 
 DAM 
option Ratio 
Jan € 15.20 € 15.23 € 10.09 1.51 Apr-15 € 24.42 € 18.05 1.35 
Feb € 14.64 € 16.53 € 8.10 2.04 May-15 € 28.17 € 17.42 1.62 
Mar € 19.81  € 12.11 1.64 Jun-15 € 26.60 € 17.36 1.53 
Apr € 29.55 € 26.54 € 21.44 1.24 Jul-15 € 28.29 € 16.76 1.69 
May € 34.25 € 36.60 € 29.55 1.24 Aug-15 € 28.01 € 16.69 1.68 
Jun € 36.25 € 36.34 € 25.25 1.44 Sep-15 € 17.21 € 15.67 1.10 
Jul € 33.26 € 34.00 € 24.60 1.38 Oct-15 € 17.03 € 12.24 1.39 
Aug € 37.80 € 25.45 € 24.75 1.03 Nov-15 € 18.84 € 13.69 1.38 
Sep € 18.98 € 18.42 € 19.32 0.95 Dec-15 € 19.25 € 13.25 1.45 
Oct € 17.10 € 14.49 € 9.94 1.46 Jan-16 € 19.66 € 16.28 1.21 
Nov € 16.05 € 14.97 € 11.55 1.30 Feb-16 € 17.07 € 17.83 0.96 
Dec € 13.26  € 12.92 1.03 Mar-16 € 16.39 € 16.71 0.98 
Table A2. Monthly Auctions FR or NL to GB and DAM averages [GB-FR/NL]+. Note: [GB-NL]+ and DAM 
option mean the positive price differences, Max(DAMGB-DAMFR,0), lagged average over 28 days  or 672 
hours. 
 IFA BritNed 
Quarterly Q1 2015 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 2015 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Auction I € 16.15 € 34.36 € 35.58 € 15.90 € 20.22 € 25.15 € 28.65 € 27.95 
Auction II € 14.98 € 32.62 € 33.15 € 16.80     
Actual/option € 10.25 € 25.48 € 21.88 € 11.84  € 19.03 € 17.49 € 14.27 
Ratio II/Actual 1.46 1.28 1.52 1.42  1.32 1.64 1.96 
Annual CAL 2015 FY 2015-16 CAL 2015 FY 2015-16 
Auction I* € 25.23  € 24.95  € 20.98    
Auction II € 24.80  € 26.38  € 23.86    
Actual € 17.38    € 15.79    
Ratio II/Actual 1.43    1.51    
Table A3. Quarterly and annual 2015 auctions FR/NL to GB and DAM averages [GB-FR/NL]+. Note: 
Auction I* for BritNed is average of previous 8 auctions, ratio is last auction to DAM.  Missing values 
denote unavailable results. 
Table A3 similarly shows the quarterly auctions and the annual auctions (two for IFA, 9 for 
BritNed), and both tables show the ratio of the latest (and presumably most accurate) 
auction price to the outturn. 
  IFA auction 
GB-FR 
DAM 
option 
ratio BN auction 
GB-NL 
DAM 
option 
ratio 
Q1 2016 € 15.71 € 16.25 0.97 € 18.61 € 17.26 1.08 
Q2 € 15.10 € 18.67 0.81 € 13.75 € 16.41 0.84 
Q3 € 16.63 € 14.69 1.13 € 12.73 € 14.93 0.85 
Q4 € 10.90 € 6.80 1.60 € 18.74 € 19.56 0.96 
Average € 14.59 € 14.10 1.03 € 15.96 € 17.04 0.94 
Annual € 17.00 € 13.97 1.22 € 17.81 € 17.00 1.05 
Table A4. Auction and DAM option results 2016. 
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Figure A1. Comparison between hedging across IFA using local power exchanges and FTRs month. 
Source: Bloomberg and ENTSO-E. 
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Appendix B. ENTSO-E Data Description34. 
1 Day-ahead prices 
For every market time unit the day-ahead prices in each bidding zone (Currency/MWh). 
Note: In case of implicit allocation, Gate closure time of the day-ahead market shall be 
understood as the output time of the matching algorithms. 
Primary owner of the data:  Power Exchanges or TSOs 
 
2 Total scheduled commercial exchanges  
means aggregated schedules, in MW per direction and border (E.g.: between two bidding 
zones) and per market time unit for all previous time horizons (yearly, monthly, quarterly, 
weekly, daily, intra-Day) corresponding to explicit allocations after each nominations process 
and implicit allocation. 
The value published for the day ahead time horizon consists of commercial exchanges in 
aggregated form from the following allocations: yearly, monthly, quarterly, weekly and daily. 
The value published for the intraday time horizon consists of commercial exchanges in 
aggregated form from the following allocations: yearly, monthly, and quarterly, weekly, daily 
and intraday. 
Time interval is one day and resolution is market time unit. 
The abovementioned values will be published after the day ahead cut off time and, if 
applicable, will be updated no later than two hours after each intra-day nomination process. 
 
3 Cross Border Physical flow  
defined as the measured real flow of energy between neighbouring bidding zones on the 
cross borders. Physical flows between bidding zones per market time unit as closely as 
possible to real time and at the latest H+1 after the end of the application period. 
Specification of calculation: Average values (in MW); netted values 
 
4 Total Nominated Capacity 
For every market time unit and per direction between bidding zones the total capacity 
nominated (MW) from capacity allocated via explicit allocations only. 
Total capacity nominated means aggregated capacity nominated by market participants from 
time horizons (yearly, monthly, quarterly, weekly, daily, intra-day) corresponding to explicit 
allocations, agreed between the TSOs and confirmed to the market. 
The total capacity nominated for submission (and publication) is the amount of nominated 
capacity in MW per border and direction (E.g.: between two bidding zones) and per market 
time unit. 
 
The value published for the long-term time horizons consists of nominations from the 
following applicable allocations: yearly, quarterly, monthly and weekly. 
The value published for the day ahead time horizon consists of nominations from the 
following allocations: yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly and daily. 
The value published for the Intraday time horizon consists of nominations from the following 
allocations: yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, daily and intraday. 
The abovementioned values will be updated after each nomination process if values are 
confirmed by TSOs. 
Primary owner of the data: Transmission Capacity Allocator / TSO 
 
5 Daily Flow Based Implicit Allocations - Congestion Income 
In case of implicit allocations, for every market time unit the net positions of each bidding 
zone (MW) and the congestion income (in Currency) per border between bidding zones. The 
information shall be published no later than one hour after each capacity allocation. 
Detailed description: 
                                               
34 From https://transparency.entsoe.eu/. 
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In case of implicit allocations: 
1. net position for each bidding zone per market time unit with indicator whether the 
value represents import or export. 
2. the congestion income per market time unit, per border between bidding zones 
except for regions with flow-based calculation method where the congestion income 
is available per bidding zone. 
 
Primary owner of the data:  Congestion revenues are calculated by the Central Counter 
Party or shipping agent. 
 
The forecasted NTC (MW) per direction between bidding zones, including technical profiles. 
only in NTC allocation method. 
 
 
